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The Choice-of-Law Revolution in the
United States: Notes on
Rereading von Mehrent
Gary J. Simsont1T
Introduction
Choice-of-law theory and practice have changed quite dramatically over the
past forty or so years in the United States. The traditional methodology of
place of wrong, place of making, and the like t has receded in importance,
2
and new approaches and concepts such as governmental interest analysis,
most significant relationship, 3 and better rule of law 4 have taken over
center stage. 5 Various conflicts scholars have played an important role in
bringing about this so-called "revolution" 6 in choice of law, and few would
dispute that Professor Arthur Taylor von Mehren ranks among the most
influential. 7 In this Article, I would like to revisit two of von Mehren's
principal writings on choice of law, both law review articles published in
the 1970s. The two articles address various aspects of choice of law, and I
t
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A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN (James A.R. Nafziger
& Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002).
1. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
2. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) (collecting the series of articles in which Currie introduced and developed his highly influential
governmental interest analysis approach).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145, 188 (1969)
(setting forth the most-significant-relationship test for issues of tort and contract).
4. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 299-304 (1966) (calling for attention to better rule of law as one of
five choice-influencing considerations).
5. For discussion of the continued, though much diminished, role of the traditional
methodology in the courts, see GARY J. SIMSON, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF
LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 14 (3d ed. 1997).
6. The term has been widely used by commentators both supportive and critical of
these developments. See, e.g., Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983); Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to
Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 181 (1977).
7. See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.11, at 43-44 (discussing
von Mehren's place in the "scholastic revolution"); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.5, at 7, 11 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing von Mehren as one
of the "small number" of scholars especially influential in stimulating the "revolution in
approaches to choice-of-law").
tt
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will highlight the importance, and analyze the implications, of several
related ideas that the articles raise.
I.

Selecting a Controlling Legal Order

At the outset of his wide-ranging 1975 article, "Recent Trends in Choice-ofLaw Methodology,"8 Professor von Mehren offers a basic framework for
analyzing the operation and adequacy of the various approaches to choice
of law developed over the years. According to von Mehren:
The choice-of-law problem presents two different, though at times interrelated, questions: (1) What legal order ultimately controls-or should control-in a situation or transaction that has significant connections with more
than one state; (2) How should 9a given legal order regulate a particular multistate situation or transaction.
Von Mehren points out that while the traditional, territorially based rules
focus on the first of these two questions, 10 newer approaches, such as governmental interest analysis, attend much more to the second." Though
critical of various aspects of the newer approaches, von Mehren clearly
welcomes their attention to the second question as beginning to fill a void
2
left by the traditional methodology.'
Few conflicts scholars today would deny the importance of addressing
von Mehren's second question. Less obvious, however, is why the first
question needs to be seriously addressed. Why cannot one simply assume
that the answer to that "jurisdiction-selecting" 13 question is always the
forum state? 14 In his article, von Mehren makes clear his belief that the
question is not so easily answered, but he is less explicit as to why it calls
for serious analysis. I explain below why, in my view, it does.
Most obviously, in courts in the United States, the question of selecting a controlling legal order cannot be answered simply by looking to the
forum state if the federal Constitution requires otherwise; and it is hardly
inconceivable that this document intended to bind together various independent-minded states would have a fair amount to say about one state's
obligation to defer to another's preferences as to how multistate situations
should be regulated. Indeed, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article
IV' 5 very plausibly may be interpreted as imposing a strong obligation of
this sort.' 6 Under governing Supreme Court precedent, however, neither
8. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60
NELL

L.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

REV.

COR-

927 (1975).

Id. at 928.
See id. at 930-33.
See id. at 933-41.
See id. at 932-33.
Id, at 932.

14. See generally WALTER

WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGA BASES OF THE CONOF LAWS (1942) (setting forth his local law theory).
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
16. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 295-301 (1992); Gary J.
FLICT
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that clause nor any other constitutional provision imposes on courts more
than a minimal obligation to think about how states other than the forum
state would regulate the choice-of-law matter at hand. 17 State autonomy in
choice of law is close to complete.'
Nonetheless, the absence of any strong obligation to defer to other
legal orders and the choice-of-law solutions they would prefer hardly settles
that such deference need not occur. A court still has considerable selfinterest as an agent of the forum state in using such deference as a strategic
device to maximize the forum state's ability in the long run to decide matters with which it is most concerned. By deferring to the choice-of-law
solutions preferred by another legal order when that order has a greater
interest, the court acts in a manner reasonably calculated to trigger reciprocal treatment and maximize the forum state's ability in the long run to
decide matters in which it has the greatest stake. 19
In calling for serious attention to the question of selecting a controlling legal order, von Mehren proposes that the question be "initially
approached" by examining whether the various legal orders with some connection to the case "have, in view of the policies underlying their putatively
20
applicable domestic rules, any reason to wish to regulate a given matter."
Later in the article von Mehren offers what appears to be the contemplated
follow-up to this "initial" approach. In criticizing Currie's exclusive focus
on the policies underlying states' domestic rules, von Mehren maintains
that "still another range of policies-those implicated through the
problems' multistate nature-deserve consideration in any effort to determine whether and how a legal order wishes to regulate a given multistate
situation. "21

I fully agree with von Mehren that a legal order's interest in regulating
a matter is not adequately gauged by attention only to the policies underlySimson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 61,
66-80 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Carroll v. Lanza, 349
U.S. 408 (1955).
18. See Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271
(1996); Arthur T.von Mehren & Donald T.Trautman, ConstitutionalControl of Choice of
Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 35 (1981). The Supreme Court has
not always regarded constitutional constraints as so marginal. Some early twentiethcentury decisions appear to give constitutional force to the traditional place-of-making
rule. See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918). Subsequently, the Court in Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), introduced a full faith
and credit test that seemed to impose significant constraints in terms of governmental
interests. For a summary of these and other developments leading up to the Court's
noninterventionist approach in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), see
Simson, supra note 16, at 61-65. For the view that the Full Faith and Credit, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses should be seen as limiting state autonomy in choice
of law much more than the Court recognizes, see id. at 66-87.
19. 1 developed this thesis previously in Gary J. Simson, Plotting the Next "Revolution" in Choice of Law: A Proposed Approach, 24 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 279, 280-84 (1991).

20. von Mehren, supra note 8, at 931.
21. Id. at 938.
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ing its domestic rules. At times a jurisdiction has an interest in applying a
policy (such as facilitating multistate activity) extrinsic to its domestic
rules and in choosing a domestic rule other than its own. If its concern
with regulating a matter is measured strictly in terms of its stake in applying the policies underlying its domestic rules, interests of that sort are
overlooked.
I am troubled, however, by the manageability of an approach that
depends so heavily on identifying policies both intrinsic and extrinsic to a
state's domestic laws. As others have observed, 22 identification of the policies that lawmakers had in mind in adopting a law often entails considerable uncertainty. It is difficult enough to articulate with confidence the
policies behind a rule of the forum state-a jurisdiction with whose history, culture, and values the court is intimately acquainted. To do so with
an out-of-state rule is generally even harder. It can be, as one court irrever'23
ently put it, "like skeet shooting with a bow and arrow."
Rather than measure a state's interest in regulating a matter by identifying potentially applicable policies and then asking whether the state has
a stake in applying them to the matter at hand, it seems preferable to do so
by focusing on the extent to which each of the states with some connection
to the case will be affected by how the case comes out. 24 By focusing on a
state's stake in determining outcome, this approach tacitly takes into
account the full range of interests that von Mehren's approach purports to
address.

25

Moreover, I suggest that it operates in a substantially more

manageable way.
If it may be assumed that effect on a state is most sensibly measured
in terms of impact on the welfare of people who make their home in the
state, 26 then the parties' states of residence provide a strong indicator of
relative state concern. If the parties reside in the same state, that state
stands out as obviously affected by, and interested in, how the case comes
out. If the plaintiff and defendant reside in different states, then the outcome clearly will affect two states; and with the plaintiff's standing to gain
what the defendant stands to lose, the impact on the two states and the
22. See, e.g., Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNEi-L- L. REV.
315, 317-19 (1972); Max Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. COMp. L.
632, 663 (1962) (book review).
23. Fisher v. Huck, 624 P.2d 177, 178 (Or. App. 1981).
24. In a prior article I set forth and explained at some length this approach to interests and to selecting a controlling legal order. See Simson, supra note 19, at 280-87. For
discussion of the difference between the "outcome-determining interests" central to my
approach and Currie-style interests, which depend upon whether application of a policy
underlying a domestic rule would benefit the residents of the lawmaking state, see id. at
282 -84.
25. See id. at 283, 291-94.
26. In designing his governmental interest analysis, Brainerd Currie assigned special
importance to impact on local residents. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 2, at 85-87.
Although 1 am proposing a different conception of "interest" than Currie proposed, I
agree with Currie that impact on local residents should be central to a definition of state
interest and I do so on the view, apparently shared by Currie, that the people who make
their home in a state are those most likely to benefit or burden its operation. See Simson, supra note 19, at 282-83 & n.9.
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states' interests would appear to be essentially equivalent. 27
Of course, the outcome of a case may affect the welfare of some people
who are not parties. For example, whether or not a defendant is found
liable for certain allegedly negligent behavior may affect the degree of care
that persons similarly situated to the defendant exercise in the future. By
the same token, whether or not an injured plaintiff recovers for loss may
affect a doctor's ability to receive full and timely payment for treating the
injuries. Measuring a state's interest in regulating the matter at hand therefore at times may appear to require attention to more than the parties and
their states of residence.
As I have argued elsewhere, 28 however, non-party-related effects generally appear to be insubstantial by comparison to party-related ones or indeterminate in magnitude absent inquiries often quite demanding of limited
judicial resources. If so, serious consideration of non-party-related effects
may well be unwarranted. In any event, even if non-party-related effects are
most reasonably viewed as warranting such consideration, gauging relative
interests by the extent to which a state stands to be affected by the outcome
of the case seems significantly more workable than doing so by an
approach that requires ascertaining the policies on domestic and foreign
lawmakers' minds.
II.

Special Substantive Rules

In his innovative 1974 article, "Special Substantive Rules for Multistate
Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law
Methodology, '2 9 von Mehren argues that the goals of choice of law at times
are best served by the court's development and application of a special
substantive rule. Rather than choose between the domestic rules of the
jurisdictions with some connection to the facts of the case, the court in
such circumstances should, in von Mehren's view, craft a new rule tailored
to the situation at hand.
Von Mehren uses illustrations to demonstrate that in some instances
judicial creation of a new rule may be cogently defended in terms of what
he calls the goal of "aptness" -that is, "providing a solution which, from
the perspective of the legal order in question, is the most appropriate (or
27. In keeping with the policy discussed above of maximizing the forum state's ability in the long run to decide matters with which it is most concerned, see supra text
accompanying note 19, a court that determines that a particular state is the only interested jurisdiction would treat that state-whether the forum state or another state-as
the controlling legal order and give effect to its views as to how the matter at hand
should be regulated. If the court determines that two states have essentially equal interests, strategic pursuit of the above policy calls for identifying the controlling order differently depending on whether or not the forum state is one of the two interested
jurisdictions. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
28. See Simson, supra note 19, at 284-86.
29. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems:
Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV.
347 (1974).
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'apt') regulation for the situation that has arisen." 30 In such instances,
none of the potentially applicable domestic rules-rules drafted with intrastate contexts primarily in mind-is well-tailored to regulate issues arising
out of the multistate context at hand.
In addition, von Mehren maintains that on some occasions special
substantive rules are warranted for reasons other than aptness and, indeed,
even at the expense of the court's sense of aptness. In situations of this
sort, two legal orders have "legitimate interests"'3 ' in resolving the choice of
law, and they would choose different domestic rules as apt for the situation. According to von Mehren, "it seems worth considering whether agreement among various legal orders might be achieved in some of these cases
by recourse to special substantive rules which would seek to adjust, on a
32
basis of equality, the views of all legitimately concerned jurisdictions."
Assume, for example, that one interested jurisdiction would regard its
domestic strict liability rule as apt to regulate the situation at hand and the
other interested jurisdiction would choose its domestic negligence rule.
Assume also that negligence cannot be shown. The court might "adjust"
the two interested jurisdictions' views "on a basis of equality" by allowing
the plaintiff to recover one-half of actual damages. 3 3 Although each jurisdiction would be sacrificing somewhat its view of aptness, the compromise
would be warranted in von Mehren's view by its service to another key
choice-of-law objective-achieving "decisional uniformity" or, as it is also
34
commonly phrased, "avoiding forum shopping."
I have no difficulty with von Mehren's argument for special substantive rules where judicial creation of such rules is defensible in terms of
aptness. Although I am inclined to doubt that the pursuit of apt solutions
justifies the creation of special substantive rules with any great frequency, I
fully agree that courts should be alert to the possibility and be willing to
act upon it. The fact that this type of judicial lawmaking has somewhat of
a legislative flavor to it seems to me beside the point. Whether in commonlaw adjudication or statutory interpretation, courts commonly engage in
lawmaking to fill gaps left by the legislature. In this instance, the gap is
simply one left by two (or more) legislatures, rather than one.
I also find a great deal valuable in von Mehren's argument for special
substantive rules as a means of achieving decisional uniformity, but here I
am ultimately unpersuaded. I share von Mehren's view that decisional uniformity is an important goal in choice of law. Indeed, I have argued (with
no discernible effect on the Supreme Court) 3 5 that the framers of the fed-

eral Constitution saw uniformity of result as so important between the
courts of the various states that they sought to mandate it when they
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 350.
Id. at 366.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 350-51, 365-67, 371.
See supra notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text.
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36
adopted the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV.
The issue at hand, however, is not simply whether decisional uniformity is an important goal. An interested forum makes a substantial sacrifice
in terms of implementing its conception of aptness when it crafts a special
substantive rule that mediates between the domestic rule that it sees as apt
and the domestic rule that the other interested jurisdiction would favor.
For this loss in terms of aptness to be warranted by the gain in terms of
decisional uniformity, decisional uniformity must be not only an important goal but also a goal that the proposed rulemaking approach effectively
serves; and on that latter score, I have serious doubts.
The proposed approach effectively serves the goal of uniformity only if
courts in other jurisdictions generally follow suit and opt for compromise
rules in like situations. For a variety of reasons, however, it is doubtful that
they would do so. First of all, the approach does not even come into play
unless the court first engages in an analysis of the relative interests of two
or more jurisdictions in imposing their views of aptness. There is no reason to believe, however, that courts that continue to adhere to the traditional territorial rules have any inclination to engage in an analysis of this
sort. In addition, the various courts that purport to follow the Second
Restatement but interpret its most-significant-relationship test as a mandate for little more than contact-counting 3 7 seem unlikely to pursue the
requisite first step with any seriousness, if at all.
Second, even many courts willing to make a conscientious effort to
gauge state interests may bridle at the thought of crafting compromise
rules. Some may regard the enterprise as too unwieldy and complicated.
Even assuming that von Mehren's proposal of splitting the difference in
potential damage awards is a simple and effective compromise rule for
cases in which the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, not all cases fit that
mold; and courts sensibly would worry that good compromise rules for
those other cases might not be so easily devised. Courts also may shy
away from the approach as too untraditional and unjudicial. For centuries
courts have understood their role in choice-of-law cases as limited to choosing between the domestic rules of jurisdictions connected to the case.
Whether out of innate conservatism or fear of a negative popular or legislative response, some courts will be unwilling to go outside the usual judicial
bounds.
Third, even courts not troubled by the notion of crafting rules of this
sort may be unwilling to devise such rules in order to promote uniformity
at the expense of aptness. Such courts may not regard decisional uniformity as a sufficiently important objective to warrant the sacrifice in aptness

36. See Simson, supra note 16, at 66-69.
37. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical
Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417, 430-32 (2000) (discussing the "disturbing
frequency of decisions" that misapply the most-significant-relationship test and "perform a much cruder choice-of-law analysis [than the drafters of the test intended], similar to the grouping-of-contacts approach"). For more on the most-significantrelationship test, see Gary J. Simson, Leave Bad Enough Alone, 75 IND. L.J. 649 (2000).
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entailed. Even more likely, cognizant of the various reasons why other
courts might not engage in similar compromise rulemaking, they may
regard the approach as promising too little in the way of uniformity to justify the sacrifice in aptness.
As a policy matter, I therefore think courts should not follow von Mehren's suggestion of crafting compromise rules that sacrifice aptness in pursuit of uniformity. If decisional uniformity were a constitutional mandate
rather than a choice-of-law objective that each state is free to pursue as
little or as much as it wishes, my reaction to his proposal would be very
different. Indeed, when I argued a number of years ago that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause should be interpreted as mandating uniformity of result
among courts within the United States, I cited von Mehren's proposal as
supplying the logical means of achieving uniformity when two states are
equally interested in the matter at hand and would resolve it by different
domestic rules. 38 Although von Mehren's approach has limited promise of
achieving uniformity in a system in which courts in different states are
under no enforceable obligation to reach the same result, it would have
great value as a means of achieving uniformity if imposed from above by
the Supreme Court.
Von Mehren's approach also holds special promise in some cases as a
means of serving an important choice-of-law objective other than decisional uniformity. Assume that the forum state has no interest in regulating the matter at hand but that two other states have interests in doing so
and their interests are essentially equal. Assume also that those two states
would select different domestic laws as applicable. In such cases, von Mehren's proposal provides the optimum approach for maximizing the forum
state's ability in the long run to decide matters with which it is most concerned. By devising a rule that mediates between the domestic laws that
the two interested jurisdictions regard as apt, the forum respects the
authority of both jurisdictions. It follows the strategy most likely to trigger
respect for the now-forum state's interests in future cases brought in those
two jurisdictions.

39

Finally, having argued the difficulties of achieving decisional uniformity, I perhaps should underline that I do see value in courts' including this
goal in their conception of aptness. Recognizing that some disuniformity
38. See Simson, supra note 16, at 76 & n.71.
39. If not apparent, it should be noted that von Mehren's approach is not strategically sound (in terms of the goal of maximizing long-term ability to decide matters with
which the forum state is most concerned) for a court faced with a situation in which the
forum state is one of two equally interested jurisdictions. If the court follows von Mehren's approach and makes a choice of law that splits the difference between the law that
the forum state would prefer and the law that the other interested jurisdiction would
select, it essentially realizes one-half of an interest now and would only recoup the other
half if the other jurisdiction were to return the favor in a similar case later brought in its
courts. Rather than risk the other jurisdiction's not reciprocating, a forum intent on
maximizing its long-term ability to decide matters with which it is most concerned
would simply give full effect to its interest now. By following the von Mehren approach
in situations of this sort, the court could not come out better in the long run as far as
vindicating its interests and it might well come out worse.
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is inevitable in a system in which courts in different states are not constrained to reach the same results, a court nonetheless may sensibly decide
that some choices of law reward forumshopping in a way that is particularly unfair and therefore should be avoided even if defensible on other
4
grounds. 0

Conclusion
Having focused on only two of von Mehren's choice-of-law writings and on
only some of the ideas that they present, I would like to emphasize in closing the broad scope of his work on choice of law. There are few issues in
the area that he has not addressed either in his numerous articles or in his
extraordinary 1965 casebook with Donald Trautman. 4 ' As indicated in
this Article, I am not always in agreement with him, but it is rare when I am
not, and even then I find that he has made a valuable contribution to the
development of choice of law.

40. 1 have argued elsewhere that a court's decision on aptness should be framed as
follows:
[A]pply forum law with regard to each issue in the case unless:
a. The foreign elements in the case bring into play a policy that would not be
materially implicated if the case were confined in its elements to the forum state;
b. Such policy militates strongly in favor of a choice of nonforum law; and
c. The policy preference expressed in the forum state's internal law is not so
strong as to belie the possibility that the forum state's lawmakers could intend it
to yield to another policy in a multistate case.
Simson, supra note 19, at 279. A policy against forumshopping between courts of different states is the type of policy contemplated by the above condition a. Whether or not in
a particular case it supplies a cogent reason for departing from forum law depends on
whether conditions b and c are met as well. For more on this approach to aptness, see id.
at 287-94. Like von Mehren, see von Mehren, supra note 8, at 952-53 & n.70, I do not
suggest that courts factor into their decision on aptness whether nonforum law is in
some sense "better" than forum law. See Simson, supra note 19, at 296-97; Gary J.
Simson, Resisting the Allure of Better Rule of Law, 52 ARK. L. REV. 141 (1999).

41.

ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHRFN & DONALDI THEODORE TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1965).

Preface
I am very pleased that the Cornell International Law Journal has inaugurated
this book review section devoted to interdisciplinaryapproaches to international law and institutions. No one could deny the importance of international
legal issues at this moment. What current events make plain, however, is that
international lawyers are by no means the only ones "making" international
law: in the past month alone, we have seen politiciansinterpreting the Geneva
Conventions at Hollywood-produced press conferences; peace activists invoking
humanitarian law in the streets of New York City and Tokyo; even the Pope
enumerating the conditions of a just war and suggesting that those who violate
international law will answerfor such violations to a higher authority.
International lawyers have always known, of course, that our subject
belonged to its publics to an extent far greaterthan other areas of law. At this
moment however, when internationallaw is called into question in such crucial and terrifying ways, it is time to address this fact in a more proactive way
in our thinking and writing. I congratulate the editors of this law journal,
therefore, for expanding international law's horizons by bringing a wider
range of disciplinary approachesand a broader range of voices into the conversation. We can only hope that a dialogue between scholars, activists and lawyers East and West, North and South, Muslim and Christian,pragmatist and
idealist, inflected by disciplinary methods and approachesfrom anthropology
to economics, will bring us a small step closer towards the ultimate goal of
international law, since Grotius' time: an end to war and the beginnings of
peace.
Annelise Riles
Professor of Law
Cornell Law School
April 2003
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